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Start Up and Sustainability: Marketisation and the Social Enterprise 
Investment Fund in England  
Kelly Hall, Pete Alcock and Ross Millar 
Abstract  
Since the end of the last century governments in many western welfare 
regimes have been keen to promote the marketisation of public service 
delivery. This requires changes in the supply of, and demand for, 
alternative providers in this market, and in particular for many 
governments this has included third sector providers. This article examines 
the attempt by the UK Labour government to promote the supply of social 
enterprises in the market for health and social care services in England, 
through the Social Enterprise Investment Fund (SEIF), introduced in 2007. 
The article reports on research evaluating the effectiveness of the SEIF, 
employing a ‘theories of change’ approach, drawing on a mix of 
administrative and survey data, qualitative interviews and case studies. 
The research found that although the SEIF had signiﬁcant beneﬁts in 
supporting the start up and growth of organisations, its contribution to 
their longer-term sustainability was more mixed as most were dependent 
on grants as a main source of income and were not in a position to 
compete for public sector contracts. This suggests that there may be limits 
to the role that public investment can play in such market making.  
Marketisation and social enterprise 
The reform of public services in the UK was one of the central themes of 
social policy development under the previous Labour governments, and 
has been taken up as a key priority by the Coalition government since 
2010. Since the turn of the century, much of social policy in the UK has 
been devolved to the separate administrations in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland; however, this article focuses on developments in 
England only. This programme of reform is sometimes referred to as 
‘modernisation’ (Margetts et al., 2010)or ‘new localism’ (Milbourne, 2009), 
but the policy agenda has in practice been based, too, on signiﬁcant 
elements of ‘marketisation’. Marketisation refers to the adoption of 
market or quasi-market practices with the aim of generating greater 
efﬁciency, effectiveness and responsiveness of public services. At the core 
of this marketisation is the involvement of private and third sector 
providers in a mixed economy of welfare provision (Powell, 2007).  
Both Labour and now the Coalition have committed themselves to 
accelerating diversity of provision, and in particular to enhancing, and 
supporting, the role of third sector organisations (TSO) in playing a greater 
role in service delivery. TSOs have been encouraged in large part because 
of expectations that they can secure the engagement and trust of excluded 
or hard-to-reach groups due to their specialist knowledge, ﬂexibility and 
independence from state structures (Haugh and Kitson, 2007; Carmel and 
Harlock, 2008), although what this has meant for these organisations in 
practice has been incorporation into the discourse and practices of 
marketisation (Salamon, 1993). There are two key dimensions to this.  
The ﬁrst implication of marketisation involves the way in which 
organisations are funded. TSOs have been opened up to a diversiﬁcation of 
funding streams, with earned income becoming more important to many 
TSOs. According to the National Council for Voluntary Organisations 
(NCVO) Civil Society Almanac, earned income for charities in England and 
Wales almost doubled in the ﬁrst decade of the new century from £10.6bn 
to £20.1bn (Clark et al., 2012: 40), and within this it is earned income from 
public sources that has grown the most. Income from public sources has 
been playing a greater and greater role in third sector funding, with public 
funding growing from £8.6bn in 2001 to £14.3bn in 2010,around 38 per 
cent of overall funding (Clark et al., 2012: 37). That increase is largely 
comprised of a reduction in the availability of grants and an increase in the 
use of contract funding for the provision of public services – with grant 
income declining from £4.4bn to £3bn and contracts increasing from 
£4.3bn to £10.9bn (Clark et al., 2012: 41).  
Contracts to deliver public services have therefore become a much more 
important part of the earned income that have shifted TSOs towards 
marketisation, and public sector contracting has led to a signiﬁcant shift in 
the way many TSOs engage with public bodies (SQW, 2007). The impact of 
this marketisation on the ways in which TSOs increase their share of 
commercial revenue through the adoption of market discipline strategies is 
explored by McKay et al.(2011), who conclude that organisations are to 
some extent adopting the practices, structures and languages of the 
private sector and ‘succumbing to market forces’. There are interesting 
comparisons with the US here, where cutbacks in government funding for 
non-proﬁts since the late 1970sand 1980shave been accompanied by 
encouragement to replace government in the provision of public services 
(Eikenberry, 2009), with the result that earned income now makes up the 
largest source of revenue for the third sector (Kerlin and Pollak, 2010).  
The second consequence of marketisation is its impact on organisational 
structure, culture and practice. The process of securing and managing 
contracts has led to TSOs having to act more and more like commercial 
organisations. Macmillan (2010) describes this as ‘mission drift’ and Billis 
(2010) suggests that it means that TSOs have been increasingly 
‘hybridised’. One particular dimension of this organisational change has 
been the trend for third sector activity to be labelled (or re-labelled) as 
social entrepreneurship. Social entrepreneurship is an activity, but it also 
can take an organisational form – social enterprise. Social enterprises have 
been promoted as being particularly capable of delivering the shift to 
earned income and marketisation within the third sector because they 
combine the market principles of business with the social values of 
charities and voluntary action (Peredo and McLean, 2006; Peattie and 
Morley, 2008).  
Social enterprises have been described as ‘more market driven, client 
driven, self sufﬁcient, commercial or business like’ than traditional 
voluntary organisations (Dart, 2004: 414), and as occupying the 
increasingly blurred boundaries between non-proﬁt and for-proﬁt. They 
can encompass a range of overlapping organisations, objectives and values 
(Pharoah et al., 2004), and academic analysis has pointed out that both 
theoretically and empirically their form and scale are contested (Teasdale, 
2010). Despite this contestation, however, social enterprise comprises a 
discourse which addresses the impact of marketisation on the third sector, 
and social enterprises provide an organisational form which can embrace 
the pressures of mission drift and hybridisation. As a result, it is claimed 
that social enterprise has the potential to respond to the need for 
adaptable approaches to service provision in the context of potentially 
scarce public funding by providing more diverse and potentially more 
reliable income streams, thereby generating greater efﬁciency and 
accountability (Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004), as well as providing the 
ﬁnancial capacity to create sustainable improvements rather than 
short-term responses to social problems (Dees and Anderson, 2003).  
Supporting public service markets: the social enterprise  
investment fund Social enterprises have been attractive to politicians 
concerned with public service reform, and they have been an increasing 
focus of political and policy intervention over the last decade or so. In 
2001, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) set up a Social Enterprise 
Unit to provide direct government support for social enterprises. This role 
was incorporated into the work of the Ofﬁce for the Third Sector (OTS) in 
2006, and has been continued in the Coalition’s re-titled Ofﬁce for Civil 
Society (OCS). The DTI unit developed a deﬁnition of social enterprises as: 
‘business[es] with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are 
principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the 
community, rather than being driven by the need to maximise proﬁt for 
shareholders and owners’ (DTI, 2002). It is this broad deﬁnition which has 
informed subsequent policy intervention and underpins the particular 
initiatives discussed in this article.  
Social enterprises capture the shift towards earned income and contracting 
within the third sector, and they have been seen as particularly important 
in implementing a more diverse provider base within health and social care 
reform – and this has enjoyed cross-party support. However, combining 
social goals with business practices has also created some potentially 
signiﬁcant problems for these organisations, especially within the context 
of the shift from grants to contracts in public funding. Questions have been 
raised over the extent to which social enterprises in practice have the 
capacity and skills needed to adapt to new ﬁnancial and political 
environments of public sector contracting and business development 
(Dees and Anderson, 2003). Many social enterprises and TSOs are small 
community groups who have tended to rely on grant funding from public 
sources, even where they are engaged in service provision (Macmillan, 
2007; Sunley and Pinch, 2011). Furthermore, third sector organisations 
encounter difﬁculties in negotiating commissioning and procurement 
processes as they tend to have less capacity and experience to tender 
successfully for contracts, especially when competing with large private 
providers (Addicott, 2011;Macmillan, 2010; Packwood, 2007). As a result, 
commissioners may perceive such organisations as not business-like 
enough (Chapman et al., 2008).  
Access to appropriate capital and skills is required to support the growth 
and sustainability of social enterprises, and enable them to bid for and 
deliver public services (OTS, 2006a; 2006b; Macmillan, 2010;Wells et al., 
2010). However, the support provided to social enterprises in particular 
has been criticised as ‘fragmented and patchy’ with an emphasis on new 
start-ups rather than established organisations looking to reach ﬁnancial 
sustainability (Lyon and Ramsden, 2006: 37). Income streams in the social 
care market in particular have been criticised as unpredictable, meaning 
that organisations live ‘hand to mouth’ in an ongoing search for funding 
(Alcock et al., 2004), limiting their capacity to grow and develop. Packwood 
(2007: 36) argued that some TSOs ‘spend so much time struggling for 
survival that they have very little time or energy to develop leadership 
skills, or to undertake the research needed to gain a clear picture of what 
is coming around the corner’. Instead, their only concern is with delivering 
services rather than in developing and investing in the future sustainability 
of the organisation.  
Access to ﬁnance and business support was recognised by Labour as being 
one of the biggest barriers facing the sector (SQW, 2007), and as a result 
the government committed the investment of signiﬁcant resources to the 
direct provision of these. These social investment programmes were part 
of a wider process of ‘market making’ which is intended to support TSOs to 
develop their capacity to secure contracts to provide public sector services. 
The most signiﬁcant of these was the Futurebuilders fund, which was 
established in 2005 (HM Treasury, 2002) as a ‘policy experiment’ to test 
how the third sector could be supported through loan funding and 
business support to improve its capacity to deliver public services and 
achieve social outcomes (Wells et al., 2010). It provided £215m between 
2005 and 2011 to support TSOs in bidding for public sector contracts. 
Formal evaluation of the fund indicated that whilst investment did appear 
to support third sector organisations to build organisational capacity and 
secure public service delivery contracts, some organisations found it 
difﬁcult to make the strategic shift needed to generate income and actually 
deliver contracts (Wells et al., 2010).  
The Social Enterprise Investment Fund (SEIF) was another element in this 
support and investment strategy. It was established by the Department of 
Health (DH) in 2007 and was focused directly upon supporting social 
enterprises to improve their capacity to deliver health and social care 
services and to compete with other public and private providers for public 
sector contracts. Health and social care was one of the key areas where 
public service reform has sought to embrace a more plural and diverse 
provider market of private and third sector delivery, and where in 
particular the last Labour government felt that social enterprise could play 
a critical role. Although the SEIF was an English programme in the area of 
health and social care, it has implications for the implementation of 
marketisation across public services, and for other welfare regimes in 
Europe and beyond those where ‘modernisation’ programmes are 
underway.  
The SEIF was initially delivered by Community Health Partnerships, an 
independent company wholly owned and controlled by DH, who 
administered the ﬁrst two rounds (August 2007 to May 2009), and was 
then transferred to the Social Investment Business (SIB) in 2009 (in 
collaboration with Local Partnerships – formerly PUK). It began with a 
potential budget of £100mtobe disbursed as a mixture of grants and loans, 
and continued after the change of government in 2010. The initial 
disbursement took place over the four-year period to March 2011, and a 
further year of funding was announced by the Coalition government for 
the ﬁnancial year 2011/12. However, its longer-term future remains 
unknown. It provided advice and seed funding for social enterprises 
‘starting up’, and investments to support the growth of ‘established 
businesses’ already delivering health and social care services. In addition, it 
offered business support, including advice on business plans and 
governance structures, to support social enterprises and help them bid for 
and win public service contracts and as a result become sustainable (DH, 
2009).  
The longer-term objectives for the SEIF included supporting the provision 
of high-quality services, improving health and social care for patients and 
service users and enabling better commissioning in line with the health 
and social care reform agenda. A further long-term aspiration for the SEIF 
was to itself become sustainable through the repayment of loan ﬁnance. 
This article draws on research to evaluate the SEIF, funded by the 
Department of Health (DH), and is focused in particular on the extent to 
which it was able to support and promote the role of social enterprises 
within the emerging market for health and social care delivery.  
Methodology  
The SEIF was a policy intervention that contained different aims and 
objectives, and which was also implemented in a number of different 
contexts. On this basis, the methodology for the research drew on 
‘realistic’ evaluation and ‘theories of change’ (Connell and Kubisch, 1998) 
approaches developed for use in evaluating complex, multi-layered 
programmes to explain how programmes work – as well as whether they 
work (Birckmayer and Weiss, 2000). This recognises the various difﬁculties 
in pinning down ‘policy success’ (Powell, 2002), the problems of multiple 
objectives which are likely to entail trade-offs, and the challenges in 
attributing change to any particular policy or incentive given the complex 
interactions between potential causal and confounding variables (Powell et 
al., 2011). It is a conceptual framework which has gained particular 
prominence in health services research (Pawson et al., 2005; Greenhalgh et 
al., 2009).  
To establish the programme theories underpinning the SEIF we undertook 
a detailed examination of its documentary history and used 
semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders to identify the 
mechanisms through which the SEIF was expected to achieve its outcomes. 
We asked interviewees about the desired outcomes of the SEIF, the types 
of activity associated with the SEIF and the measurement of these 
outcomes and activities, including unintended outcomes and impact of 
contextual factors. Analysis of this was used to generate a diagrammatic 
articulation of the short, medium and long-term steps involved in achieving 
SEIF outcomes (see Lyon et al., 2010). This programme theory provided the 
basis for the evaluation of the SEIF, with the different steps in the 
programme acting as research questions against which empirical data 
could be interrogated and the programme theory ‘tested’. These are 
examined in more depth in the full research report of the evaluation (see 
Alcock et al., forthcoming).  
Key characteristics of marketisation underpinned the theories of change 
associated with the SEIF, and we focus primarily on these. We analyse the 
extent to which SEIF investments supported the start up and sustainability 
of social enterprises and helped to prepare them to secure service 
contracts within the developing commissioning environment in health and 
social care. We obtained this empirical material by employing a mixed 
methods approach, combining analysis of administrative data, a survey of 
investees and in-depth case studies with a selection of social enterprises. A 
database of all SEIF applicants (up to 31 March 2011) was also compiled, 
which included all investments and the amount and type of investment 
received by each investee.  
The survey was administered online, with telephone back-up, and was 
undertaken with all SEIF investees who had received their investment 
decision by 31 March 2010. Organisations were classiﬁed into four key 
areas: health and wellbeing (53%), healthcare (17%), social care (16%) and 
social exclusion (14%). Out of the 285 investees, 172 completed the survey 
– a 60 per cent response rate. Non-respondents primarily included those 
organisations that had closed down or where email addresses had 
changed. The survey used a mixture of closed and open questions to 
gather information on applicant experiences and organisational outcomes 
of the SEIF, and was analysed in SPSS. Given the relatively volatile nature of 
the social enterprise ﬁeld and the difﬁculty in contacting some 
organisations, this was a relatively high response rate and provided a 
reliable basis for assessing organisational experience of the programme.  
The in-depth case study research comprised comprehensive documentary 
analysis and qualitative interviews with 16 social enterprise organisations 
during 2010/2011. The sample was purposive in its aim and included a 
diverse range of successful (n = 13) and unsuccessful applicants (n = 3) to 
the SEIF. Selected organisations ranged from large social enterprises 
delivering mainstream healthcare services to small organisations delivering 
wellbeing services to a local or socially excluded community. These social 
enterprises were therefore not representative of all English health and 
social care services, and instead included a signiﬁcant number that worked 
with vulnerable groups. A total of thirty qualitative interviews were carried 
out with representatives from the selected social enterprises. The 
interviews gathered qualitative data on applicant experiences and 
organisational outcomes of the SEIF to build upon the data collected in the 
survey. A further twelve qualitative interviews were carried out with health 
and social care commissioners and social enterprise support agencies. 
Qualitative data from the interviews (and open survey questions) were 
coded and then thematically analysed using the NVivo software 
programme (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
Supporting social enterprises  
Assisting start-ups  
The SEIF supported 531 social enterprises by investing £80,712,510 up to 
2011 into their start up or growth. The organisations received an average 
of £152,001(see Table 1), although this ranged considerably from £546 up 
to £3,115,150.Central to the aim of the Fund was to provide a mixture of 
grant and loan funding, in order to help organisations to develop business 
plans and to challenge the potential for grant dependency identiﬁed by 
Macmillan (2007). Despite this, however, 86 per cent of investments 
(£69,339,872) were in the form of grants (with a further £3,086,430 of 
repayable grants), and only 14 per cent (£11,372,637)wereloans.A total of 
ﬁfty-ﬁve organisations (10%) received a loan; however the majority of  
TABLE 1. All SEIF Investments up to 31 March 2011 (Rounded to the 
nearest £)  
ALL  
Total investment £80,712,510 Total number of investees 531 Average 
investment per investee £152,001 GRANTS  
Total grant investment £69,339,873 Total number of grant investees 523 
Average grant size per investee £132,581  
LOANS Total loan investment £11,372,637 Total number of loan investees 
55 Averageloansizeper investee £206,775  
Source: SEIF administrative data  
these investees also received a grant and only eight investees (2%) 
received a loan only.  
Grant funding was especially prominent for social enterprises ‘starting up’, 
as they were often not in a position to make interest repayments. The 
survey of investees indicated that 52 per cent of SEIF funded organisations 
were new start-ups (including existing charities that were beginning to 
trade), and the case studies suggested that many organisations starting up 
may have been using the SEIF to obtain grant-based start-up funding, 
which was used to fund business support, legal and development 
expenses. Within this, external and specialised consultancy support was 
the key component, which enabled the development of marketing tools, a 
business plan, legal frameworks and accountancy systems.  
There are some basic ingredients if you want to bake a cake, you 
need eggs, ﬂour, milk, butter, well if you want to have a social 
enterprise, you need legal support, you need those pieces, and you 
need somebody to tell you how to do it. (Healthcare SE 1)  
As far as we’re concerned the impact [of SEIF] is very simple, it has 
made the difference between setting the company up and not 
...we’d have found it difﬁcult to get investment from elsewhere. 
(Health and Wellbeing SE 3)  
Grant support was particularly important for those ﬁfty organisations that 
‘spun out’ from NHS agencies under the Labour government’s Right to 
Request initiative (Miller and Millar, 2011). These comprised 10 per cent of 
all investees whoreceivedatotalinvestmentof£8,333,385. These ‘spin outs’ 
were often led by clinicians and for them SEIF was critical in providing 
business and management skills through funding consultancy costs, legal 
expenses and employing business support managers.  
As a clinician, suddenly having to go from being, a dare I say it, a 
competent clinician and very comfortable in that to being pushed 
way out of my comfort zone to running a company and that’s a 
huge transition. (Healthcare SE 3)  
For these organisations in particular, the SEIF was also the only potential 
source of ﬁnancial support.  
[SEIF] was the only place we could go. I mean obviously with the 
Right to Request, whilst PCTs [Primary Care Trusts] have to offer 
support, support doesn’t equate to money. (Healthcare SE 4)  
The remainder of SEIF investments (48%) were used to develop and grow 
existing social enterprises. From the 48 per cent who were expanding 
within an existing social enterprise, most (44%) were already delivering 
health and/or social care services. Therefore, only 4 per cent of investees 
were using the SEIF investment to enable their social enterprise to break 
into the health/social care sector. Case study ﬁndings suggest that many of 
these organisations received a grant as well as some loan-based 
investments to make structural improvements, including purchasing and 
refurbishing buildings or equipment.  
The organisations receiving SEIF investment were diverse, including 
‘hybrids’ with multiple functions and specialties, but virtually all were 
operating with missions that we deﬁned as ‘health inclusion’, responding 
to gaps within the health and social care system rather than replacing 
existing provision. They included in particular services that targeted 
disadvantaged or vulnerable groups, including those struggling with 
poverty, mental illness or the harm caused by alcohol, drugs or violence. 
The SEIF thus played an important role in helping the DH to meet health 
inequalities targets (DH, 2010;Marmot, 2010).  
Investing in sustainability  
The longer-term sustainability of social enterprises in health and social care 
depends critically on their ability to bid for and deliver public services, and 
SEIF investments also aspired to increase the capacity and skills of 
organisations to do this. This was inevitably a longer-term challenge, and it 
is an area where the evidence from the evaluation was more mixed. There 
was some evidence that social enterprises were already delivering health 
and/or social care services and were winning new contracts. Over half 
(52%) of the social enterprises in the survey reported that they had 
obtained new contracts to deliver public services since the SEIF investment 
(mainly funded by PCTs or Local Authorities), and nearly aquarter (23%) 
had won at least three new contracts since the SEIF investment. However, 
this left 48 per cent of investees that had won no new contracts at all. Over 
a quarter (29%) of these investees did however have contracts before the 
SEIF investment, indicating that, for some, the SEIF investment may have 
been used to support the delivery of an existing contract rather than to 
generate new ones. Nonetheless, our case study data indicated that some 
social enterprises were ﬁnding it hard to renew or replace existing 
contracts once they ended.  
We talked to the PCT about our counselling service, and this was 
not the right time in the cycle. They had already just taken out a 
big contract with another counselling organisation. And so we have 
to wait, and I think probably its early next year when the PCTs will 
be thinking about a new contract for counselling services. (Health 
and Wellbeing SE 2)  
Those targeting excluded groups or users with high needs were ﬁnding it 
especially hard, as these services were often expensive to run.  
I mean who’s going to be interested in services like this that are 
perceived as high-cost, and they are high-cost but that’s because of 
the level of need. (Healthcare SE 4)  
The case studies revealed that SEIF was essential in sustaining these 
organisations in the short term for a year or two, but beyond this the 
future remained uncertain.  
I mean, it [SEIF] gives us a lifeline. We can manage comfortably for 
a year, but I really need, this year, to get some more money in. 
(Social Care SE 1)  
The survey ﬁndings also indicated that some enterprises were struggling to 
survive, especially within a developing economic climate in which public 
services were being cut back. Thus 13 per cent of SEIF-funded 
organisations had closed down, primarily as a result of a lack of further 
funding. Although this ﬁgure is similar to the average closure rate of UK 
businesses, which stands at approximately 12 per cent (ONS, 2010), our 
ﬁgures are likely to understate the problem within social enterprises since 
those which have closed down would have been less likely to respond to 
the survey. In addition, the case studies revealed that many social 
enterprises were simply ‘getting by’ with support from any ﬁnancial 
sources that were available to them. Many felt a lack of security or 
certainty for the future, especially during a time of economic instability 
and public sector reform.  
ESF [European Social Fund] has now gone. The money’s now going 
away ...In that way, I mean, don’t get me wrong, the organisation 
wouldn’t go, but that’s our last project at the moment. So things 
have been disappearing gradually through ESF going. (Social 
Exclusion SE 1)  
Some social enterprises in our study were able to secure new contracts 
and generate their own commercial income, but many remained grant 
dependent. Survey data indicated that 51per cent of respondents had 
recently received public sector grants in addition to any SEIF investments 
and 49 per cent intended to apply for a further public sector grants. Yet 
very few wanted to take on loans. As mentioned above, only 14per cent of 
investments were loans, with only 2per cent being exclusively loan-based, 
and only 18per cent of survey respondents reported that they were 
considering applying for a public sector loan in the future.  
The high reliance on grant funding in the SEIF was exaggerated by the 
requirement that organisations should only be funded if they were 
regarded as ‘unbankable’ by independent or commercial investors – 
however a small proportion (4%) of investments had in fact received bank 
loans in the previous year, although perhaps for different purposes. This 
was intended to ensure that SEIF loans did not unnecessarily distort the 
broader investment market for social enterprises, and indeed 
co-investment with other lenders was encouraged through a Funders’ 
Forum in which these were represented. Forty-ﬁve coinvestment deals 
adding up to a total of £24,130,257were made up to 2011, but the majority 
were co-investor grants and a large proportion (47%) came from public or 
EU sources, with only 22per cent from high street banks. There was 
therefore considerable evidence of a reluctance to take on loan funding by 
the organisations applying for support from the SEIF and many of the 
survey respondents were only searching for grant funding. Many felt that 
they were not in a ﬁnancially stable enough position to be able to take on a 
loan, as they may not be able to make repayments.  
All of a sudden I’ve got to ﬁnd about £7,000a month [loan 
repayments] ...I think it just would have been a lot happier and less 
of a risk for the organisation if we just got the full grant. (Social 
Exclusion SE 1)  
This was linked to concerns about the business and management skills 
needed to run the organisations and secure new contracts, which was 
particularly acute for the ‘spin out’ organisations, led by clinicians who 
found they were often ‘muddling through’ and on a huge ‘learning curve’.  
We’re clinicians by background so one of the challenges is trying to 
grow business heads and to learn the skills that we need to run the 
business effectively ... Nobody’s taught me how to do PQQs and 
ITTs. That’s something that I’m having to learn so again, I’m still 
doing some of the business as usual and trying to learn new skills 
and you’ve got to be really receptive to that. (Healthcare SE 4)  
It would have been great just to have a little bit of breathing space 
to professionally develop as a business person ...So tendering is 
very much my thing at the moment if we can try and source some 
support with that. (Healthcare SE 4)  
SEIF investments did provide opportunities for social enterprise managers 
to develop business and professional skills through training, or 
alternatively to buy in the business support that was required. A signiﬁcant 
amount of SEIF investment was used to fund business support from 
external and specialist sources, such as a business support manager or a 
consultant. The fund managers, SIB, did also provide business support as 
part of their investment package, although this was offered to only 33 per 
cent of investees surveyed, and some felt that it was not adequate or 
specialised enough for their needs.  
[The investment ofﬁcer] seemed not to understand the nature of the 
business we were establishing. (Survey respondent from Health and 
Wellbeing SE)  
The commissioning environment 
The ability of social enterprises to become sustainable through the 
securing of contracts to deliver health and social care services does not just 
depend upon their organisational development and preparedness. The 
value of social enterprises as providers also has to be recognised by those 
commissioning the services. Both the Labour and the Coalition 
governments have been keen to improve the commissioning environment, 
with the new government promoting their ‘any qualiﬁed provider’ strategy 
(DH, 2011). However, the SEIF research suggested that social enterprise 
delivery of health care services was still at an embryonic stage, especially 
in the minds of those commissioning services.  
It requires resources, a lot of time and effort to make it work and I 
think generally with, particularly, clinical services, we haven’t felt 
the push to get social enterprise involved. I don’t sense buy in at 
management level, I don’t sense buy in at any level above really 
front line delivery stuff. (SE Consultant 2)  
Although some commissioners believed they had positive relationships 
with social enterprises and encouraged them to grow and develop, they 
continued to be concerned that these organisations were not quite 
investment ready or capable of taking on the requirements of the 
contracting process.  
You realise actually that [social enterprises] aren’t in a position to 
tender for business. Either they often know their stuff, but they’re 
not good at writing business cases, or working out the ﬁnancial 
aspects and the governance around those. (PCT Commissioner 3)  
These risks meant that providing a contract to social enterprises to deliver 
public services was a gamble. Furthermore, for those social enterprises 
that were ‘investment ready’, commissioning structures and processes 
were not particularly amenable. Bureaucratised and formal procurement 
processes were often in tension with the relative ﬂuidity of small 
community-based social enterprises.  
Things have tightened up, certainly government-wise and in terms 
of how you have to account for how you spend the money, but 
particularly in terms of ...the rules around procurement, making it 
much more difﬁcult. You can’t just go out to one organisation, to a 
local community group ...so it’s still relatively easy to contract with 
the big players in the voluntary sector, but not so easy to contract 
with the smaller ones ...You have to be even more rigorous about 
who you’re investing in. (PCT Commissioner 7)  
The SEIF was not an intervention in commissioning practices, of course, but 
its aspiration of promoting sustainability of social enterprises delivering 
health and social care was inevitably compromised by the limitations that 
have been exposed by our research.  
Towards marketisation  
The development and operation of the SEIF must be seen within the 
context of marketisation and social enterprise outlined in the introduction 
to this article. As we argued, marketisation in the UK meant that TSOs, and 
social enterprises in particular, had to be willing and able to establish and 
survive within competitive markets, and the Labour governments were 
keen to do what they could to promote and support them in this. The SEIF 
was one such initiative that aimed to equip social enterprises with the 
capacity and skills to be able to compete with other public, private and 
third sector providers within an open market for health and social care. 
The research suggested that it has been largely successful in enabling the 
start up and growth of social enterprises, and expanding the range of 
providers. What is more, most of these organisations were outside of 
mainstream health and primary care services and were working with 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in the health inclusion ﬁeld. A 
particularly important dimension of this were the ‘Right to Request’ 
organisations, most of whom felt that without SEIF investment they would 
not be able to exist. This tallies with the ﬁndings of a recent NAO study 
(2011) which reported that the majority of the thirty-seven Right to 
Request organisations, which had by then spun out of the NHS, had 
received SEIF support.  
Here, the fund was a major new source of income for social enterprises 
and had signiﬁcant effects in helping organisations to become established 
and to expand their capacity for competition and delivery. Furthermore, it 
focused investment especially in the health inclusion ﬁeld, where public 
provision was generally weakest, helping the NHS to meet some of its 
equalities targets. However, despite initial intentions, the vast majority of 
SEIF investments took the form of grants, and even where loans were 
made these were often accompanied by grants or were on terms that were 
more favourable than those available in the external commercial markets 
or where commercial loans were not available. These investments 
supported the start up of social enterprises, but it less clear that they 
provided for their longer-term sustainability, with 13per cent of 
organisations in our survey closing down within the funding period.  
The high proportion of grant funding within the SEIF was primarily driven 
by demand from applicants. However, this was also compounded by 
administrative factors. These included the ‘bankability’ test for loan 
applications mentioned above, but this was also compounded by the 
impact of the ‘annuality’ rules on all applications. As the SEIF was a public 
sector fund, it required the fund managers to spend and account for 
funding within each ﬁnancial year. This meant that administrators were 
under pressure to ‘get the money out quickly’ at the end of the year, and in 
this context grants were more attractive to them. This was recognised as a 
problem by the Department of Health, but it could not be avoided given 
the way the scheme was set up. Overall, therefore the management of the 
scheme operated to exclude many of those organisations which might be 
the most willing and able to take on loans.  
As a result, whilst the SEIF had been largely successful in enabling the start 
up and growth of social enterprises, and expanding the range of providers, 
when it came to enabling the longer-term sustainability of social 
enterprises and their ability to secure and manage longer-term investment 
funding, the research suggests that the SEIF was less successful. It can take 
some time for organisations to reach this level of development, and this 
was particularly true for the ‘Right to Request’ agencies spinning out of the 
NHS, for whom previous research has suggested that the timescale 
required to establish a social enterprise is often underestimated (Tribal, 
2009; Miller and Millar, 2011). Many social enterprises were not therefore 
in a position to be able to compete with other public, private and third 
sector providers to secure contracts and, as explained, this was 
compounded by the limited understanding of social enterprises in a 
commissioning environment. Here the evidence supports previous 
research that social enterprises may struggle to secure new contracts or 
re-tender for existing ones (NAO, 2011; Addicott, 2011).  
This means that the longer-term sustainability of social enterprises, and 
their ability to compete and survive within the developing market for 
health and social care, will require more than the short term grant support 
provided by the SEIF. The future of the fund is itself in doubt now in any 
case, in particular given the spending constraints imposed on the NHS, and 
this has been compounded, ironically, by the heavy reliance on grant 
funding through to 2011, which has not left a signiﬁcant return on loan 
repayments into any future fund. An initial aspiration of the Department of 
Health was for the SEIF itself to become a sustainable source of funding for 
social enterprise. This may not now be realised in practice.  
Concluding remarks  
The SEIF provided an excellent example of the strengths and weaknesses 
of government investment to promote social enterprise in the context of 
public service delivery. Although this was an English initiative, its generic 
aims of supporting the start up and sustainability of social enterprises 
through grant funding and loan investment is a model which other 
governments may be seeking to replicate, and which policy makers and 
practitioners addressing these issues in different welfare regimes are likely 
to ﬁnd instructive.  
The SEIF had up to £100m to invest in social enterprises over four years 
from 2007 to 2011, and it promised to support the start up and 
sustainability of social enterprises and prepare them to become 
‘investment ready’ providers in a marketised health and social care 
environment. However, our research, in evaluating the effectiveness of the 
SEIF in achieving these changes, in practice presents a rather mixed 
picture. There are some important – and to some extent contradictory – 
messages that emerge.  
Introducing marketisation into public service delivery requires changes in 
both the supply of, and demand for, alternative providers. Supply is a 
problem, particularly in the third sector, if organisations are not prepared 
for and equipped to enter into the competitive market, and for many of 
the smaller and newer social enterprises encountered in our evaluation 
this was a problem. Governments can seek to address this problem by 
providing support to equip organisations and prepare them for the market, 
but access to and use of this investment will depend upon the demand for 
support and the ability of fund administrators to meet this. When this is 
translated into practice, it may lead to an over-reliance on short-term 
grant funding, focused on helping organisations to get established and 
enter the market, rather than the longer-term loan and investment funding 
which might enable them to secure a sustainable economic base for the 
future.  
These supply-side problems are also compounded if the demand for social 
enterprise providers in health and social care is limited by the perceptions 
and activities of commissioners. Our research did not focus directly on the 
commissioning of health and social care services, but we did uncover 
evidence that some commissioners at least did not fully understand the 
circumstances and the potential of social enterprises and were cautious 
about extending market contracts to them. These problems do not mean 
that the marketisation of public services is ﬂawed or unachievable. But 
simply wishing for a diverse market of alternative providers does not make 
one, and providing public investment to prepare organisations for this may 
not meet the long-term changes needed to create it.  
Finally, there is another dimension to the SEIF investments and the 
promotion of social enterprises in providing alternative forms for the 
delivery of health and social care. The underlying policy goal here was to 
introduce more choice and diversity in health care provision, with the 
expectation that this would lead to improvements in service delivery – and 
ultimately health outcomes. Our evaluation of the SEIF did not seek to 
address these longer-term health policy goals, not the least because any 
assessment of their achievement would indeed need to be conducted over 
a longer term. Nevertheless these research challenges remain, and from 
them ﬂow arguably the most important policy questions – to what extent 
does investment in alternative providers of service lead to diversity of 
health care services and improved outcomes for citizens?  
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